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THE MODIFICATION OF MULTILATERAL
CONVENTIONS BY MEANS OF
"NEGOTIATED RESERVATIONS" AND OTHER
"ALTERNATIVES": A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE ILO AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE-
PART TWOt
W. PAUL GORMLEY*
V. CouNciL oF EUROPE
This political institution originally intended to follow the basic rule of
ILO that absolutely no reservations or variation from the text as signed
would be permitted. Moreover, even the traditional international law
norm, permitting reservations if all other parties accepted, was rejected
on the seemingly valid theory that all differences could be satisfactorily
negotiated beforehand. That is to say, an unusually high degree of homo-
geneity existed between this select group of states, because of the fact
that they had all banded together for the purpose of guaranteeing basic
human fights and fundamental freedoms on the continent of Europe, fol-
lowing the failure of the United Nations to implement the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights"' at the global level." All of these European
countries had suffered under Nazi tyranny and it was assumed that their
desire to protect human rights against the arbitrary actions of govern-
ments-as supported by the common European tradition-would prevent
disagreements incapable of solution during negotiations. Logically, con-
tinued disagreement similar to that encountered by the states ratifying
the Genocide Convention would never arise, since such disputes would
have been eliminated by the negotiators. While the Council has largely
succeeded in effectively protecting human rights (and even property and
economic interests) 8 complete solidarity has not been achieved. The rea-
sons need not be recounted here, but two obvious answers are to be found
in the resurgence of national sovereignty and the increase in the number
of states joining the political union, and the complicated fields covered by
European Conventions. Realistically, the European Treaty Series-pres-
t The first part of this article appeared in the October issue of this volume, 39 Fordham
L. Rev. 59 (1970).
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa. Member of the District of
Columbia Bar.
81. GA.Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
82. W. Gormley, The Procedural Status of the Individual Before International and
Supranational Tribunals 45-49 (1966).
83. Id. at 70-126.
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ently including over sixty-nine conventions and protocols-covers so
many diverse and technical areas that complete agreement cannot always
be obtained among eighteen independent nations.84 Hence, the Council
is facing a dilemma somewhat similar to that confronting ILO and OAS,
though admittedly on a smaller scale. The writer does not mean to imply
that an extremely high degree of cooperation has not been realized, but
differences have arisen necessitating some modification of previously
negotiated treaties, because their texts are necessarily based on com-
promise. Notwithstanding the fact that a much higher standard of
unanimity has been obtained than in the larger organizations-namely
the United Nations, ILO, and OAS 8 -- it was necessary for the Council
to develop a unique European law incorporating a special system of
negotiated reservations due to the ever present legal clash between
preserving the treaty's integrity and at the same time permitting as many
Members as possible to ratify. In rejecting both the "developing inter-
national norms" and the unlimited-use theory of the OAS, the Council
has developed a new solution, in practice very close to the criteria set
forth by the International Court of Justice in the Genocide Case."0
A. Negotiated Reservations
The basic rule governing the use of reservations is fairly simple; only
those reservations specifically agreed to in advance will be permitted.
Secondly, such reservations must be set forth within particular articles or
sections designated in the main text, supplemental annexes, or protocols,
with the result that any Member ratifying is required to accept the con-
vention as negotiated. No additional reservations will be permitted I In
reality, then, the Member must accept the "package deal" or remain out-
side the Convention if it finds some portion incompatible with its na-
tional interests. In short, the writer submits that the Council has devel-
oped a unique practice, falling midway between the ILO system of
prohibiting all reservations and the older international law standard of
allowing reservations only in those situations wherein all other states
agreed to accept the unilateral reservations at signature, ratification, or
adherence. As such, no comparison can be made with the OAS system
of permitting unlimited reservations because the Latin American and
European systems are totally different. The Council, on the other hand,
84. Greece was requested to withdraw from the Council of Europe by a vote of the
Consultative Assembly in January, 1969.
85. Tn~kids, Regimes Internes et Organisation Internationale, 110 Recucil des Cours 271
(1963 III).
86. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 15.
See analysis in Bishop, supra note 5, at 281-93, in connection with Bishop, supra note 4,
at 348-52.
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has chosen the solution of resolving in advance of signature those portions
(chapters, articles, and paragraphs) not absolutely necessary to the es-
sential object and purpose of the treaty. The plenipotentiaries achieve
this delicate balance.
The travaux preparatories need not be recounted in a study of this
type. Suffice to say, a provisional list of possible reservations is drawn up
for the purpose of subsequent negotiation. A selection is then made as to
those reservations deemed acceptable, with or without some modification.
Other problems of a highly technical nature must also be considered,
primarily whether to place such items-including escalation and flexibil-
ity devices-in the main text or in accompanying annexes or protocols.
In brief, the normal practices of treaty negotiation are followed; how-
ever, the result is similar to the test set down by the International Court
of Justice,17 but with one major additional advantage. The scope of ac-
ceptable reservations is determined beforehand by the negotiating parties,
not by an arbitral or judicial tribunal after serious controversy has arisen.
Even after an international tribunal has rendered its decision, the status
of the Convention remains in doubt for the reason that a depositary may
never be absolutely certain whether the required number of ratifications
has been obtained.
B. The Evolution of the Regional Norm
The above mentioned negotiated reservation should be treated as a
philosophical concept rather than a single element of treaty law because it
can take several forms. Specifically, the evolution of the Council's reserva-
tions can be traced from a simple beginning, such as the single exception,
exclusion, or alternative-a practice originally influenced by the ILO
system. Accordingly, the main groups of "reservations" to be discussed
below are important not only because they show the less sophisticated
stages in the emergence of the negotiated reservation, but these more
limited devices are still frequently chosen. Not every European Con-
vention will incorporate an elaborate reservations clause. Indeed, the
87. "It is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without
its consent, and that consequently no reservation can be effective against any State without
its agreement thereto. It is also a generally recognized principle that a multilateral convention
is the result of an agreement freely concluded upon its clauses and that consequently none
of the contracting parties is entitled to frustrate or impair, by means of unilateral decisions
or particular agreements, the purpose and raison d'etre of the convention. To this principle
was linked the notion of the integrity of the convention as adopted, a notion which in its
traditional concept involved the proposition that no reservation was valid unless it was
accepted by all the contracting parties without exception, as would have been the case if it
had been stated during the negotiations." Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Conven-
tion on Genocide, [1951] I.CJ. 15, 21.
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less complicated articles are employed much more frequently than the
elaborate reservations and escalation clauses found in the Convention
of Human Rights,88 the European Social Charter,8" and very recent agree-
ments, particularly the Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple
Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality."
Furthermore, several types of these more limited qualifications or options
can be used together in the same convention or in conjunction with very
elaborate reservations clauses as can be seen from Article 31 "Restric-
tions" of the European Social Charter and the Code of Social Security,
discussed below.
C. Single Option
This classification comprising a broad group of fairly simple devices-
often contained in, or relating to, a single article (or subsection)-might
be open to question as a matter of definition on the ground that these
options might not even be considered to constitute full reservations. Ad-
mittedly, the writer has adopted a very broad standard in order to include
this group. Generally, he reaches the conclusion that very few European
Conventions exclude all reservations or flexibility devices. Exceptions are
The General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities 1 and Protocols"2
thereto, plus some of the scientific and medical conventions, i.e., the
European Agreement on the Exchange of Therapeutic Substances of
88. Europ. T.S. No. 5, art. 64 (1950-1952), 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
89. Europ. T.S. No. 35, art. 20 (1-3) (1961), 529 U.N.T.S. 89.
90. Europ. T.S. No. 43, arts. 7-8 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Convention of Cases of
Multiple Nationality]. For other recent Conventions see notes 180 & 183 infra.
91. Europ. T.S. No. 2 (1949-1961), 250 U.N.T.S. 12.
92. Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of
Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 10 (1952), 250 U.N.T.S. 32. See also Second Protocol to the
General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No.
22 (1956), 261 U.N.T.S. 410; Third Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges and
Immunities of the Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 28 (1959) ; Fourth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe, Europ. T.S.
No. 36 (1961), 544 U.N.T.S. 328.
Higher standards can be negotiated between the Council and Member States, but these
modifications would constitute separate agreements. The General Agreement on Privileges
and Immunities of the Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 2, art. 20 (1949), 250 U.N.T.S.
12, maintains: "The Council may conclude with any Member or Members supplementary
agreements modifying the provisions of this General Agreement, so far as that Member or
those Members are concerned." Similarly, the Amendment to the Statute of the Council of
Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 11 (1953), 196 U.N.T.S. 347, does not contain reservation clauses.
A more recent example of an instrument containing no reservations can be seen in Protocol
to the European Agreement on the Protection of Television Broadcasts, Europ. T.S. No. 54
(1965).
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Human Origin,93 which does not have an apparent reservation, but the
implementation of assumed duties is left to the states. In addition, some
limitations can be inferred simply from the fact that domestic supplies
must be deemed adequate before export is permitted under Article 2.
Consequently, some variation may be found in the Convention's applica-
tion, but no reservation clause is present. A similar illustration can be
seen in the European Agreement on the Exchanges of Blood-Grouping
Reagents.s4 Very few additional examples exist. 5
A few corresponding amendments, by no interpretation validly equated
with negotiated reservations, should also be cited, such as Protocol Num-
ber Three to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 6 amending Articles 29, 30, and 34. By way of comparison, articles
allowing subsequent amendment are often set forth in the treaty, and their
significance lies in the fact that the Members can subsequently raise or
lower obligations previously accepted. Thus, Article 3 of the Agreement
Between the Member States of the Council of Europe on the Issue to
Military and Civilian War-Disabled of an International Book of Vouchers
for the Repair of Prosthetic and Orthopaedic Appliances,17 states: "The
Regulations appended to this Agreement constitute an administrative
arrangement and may at any time be amended or supplemented by the
Governments of the Parties to this Agreement." In reality, by modifying
the implementing regulations a change is made in the treaty. But is it
valid to conclude that Article 3 constitutes a reservation? Although the
answer must be given in the negative, this Article does bear a striking
similarity to some of the flexibility devices of ILO, especially when ap-
plied in connection with Article 7(2), permitting the extension of the
Convention to additional territories, and 7 (3), providing for a subsequent
withdrawal of coverage.
D. Exclusion Clauses
As pointed out earlier, a number of these border-line cases will not con-
stitute true reservations if a narrower definition is chosen.9 8 Although this
93. Europ. T.S. No. 26 (1958), 590 U.N.T.S. 320 [hereinafter cited as Exchange of
Therapeutic Substances Agreement].
94. Europ. T.S. No. 39 (1962).
95. E.g., Protocol to the European Convention on the Equivalence of Diplomas Leading
to Admission to Universities, Europ. T-S. No. 49 (1964), 514 U.N.T.S. 270 [hereinafter cited
as European Convention on Equivalence of Diplomas].
96. Europ. T.S. No. 45 (1963).
97. Europ. T.S. No. 40 (1962), 590 U.N.T.S. 324 [hereinafter cited as Agreement on
Military and Civilian War-Disabled].
98. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 450-52.
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same observation was offered as to ILO Conventions, 0 an all-inclusive
standard was used, which in turn was broken down into five main
categories. A similar approach will now be used as the starting point for
an examination of European Conventions, although the writer finds it
much more difficult to classify the very complicated reservations and
flexibility devices of the Council than the alternatives of ILO because the
Council of Europe employs a greater number of techniques. Indeed, it is
not invalid to conclude that each Convention has incorporated specialized
provisions designed to meet the needs not only of the Member States but
also of the special subject matter. At the very least, the Council has
followed a pragmatic approach and resolved each problem as it arose,
rather than first enunciating an unyielding theory of treaty modification.
1. Exceptions
As indicated in the discussion of ILO's conventions, paragraphs or
articles enabling a state to exclude certain sections of a treaty can have
the same effect as negotiated reservations. This device has been employed
by the Council, as governments have previously agreed that the effect
of certain conventions need not apply to selected subjects. For example,
Article 8 of the European Agreement on Mutual Assistance in the Matter
of Special Medical Treatments and Climatic Facilities00 contains the
following exceptions: "The provisions of this Agreement shall not
prejudice the provisions of municipal law, bilateral or multilateral treaties,
conventions or agreements, or the regulations of the European Economic
Community which are already in force or may come into force, under
which more favourable treatment would be accorded to the persons re-
ferred to in Article L"" The similarity of this Article to ILO standards
is very striking. Negotiating states have permitted themselves an ex-
tremely wide range of discretion without which the six Members of the
Common Market might not be able to ratify because of prior interna-
tional commitments. Specifically, no member of the EEC can adopt any
treaty or local law inconsistent with Community obligations, under
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty. 02 Thus, a very vital hierarchy of law con-
flict has been avoided by the use of a reservation.
Other examples of a "border-line classification" can be cited; 10 3 how-
99. See Part I of this article, p. 69 supra.
100. Europ. T.S. No. 38 (1962), 544 U.N.T.S. 81 [hereinafter cited as Medical Treat-
ment Convention].
101. Id. art. 8.
102. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 14.
103. E.g., The European Agreement Concerning Programme Exchanges by Means of
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ever, the use of the single exception-often in connection with other
flexibility and reserving devices-can actually move into the realm of the
negotiated reservation. In fact, it is extremely difficult to discover the
exact dividing line. Unlike the ILO legal system in which all such devices
are treated solely as exceptions and, therefore, alternatives to reservations,
the Council takes the position that such articles are in fact true reserva-
tions.
2. National Legislation
The Council is also employing a technique, that might be held to con-
stitute a very "questionable reservation," by which general objectives and
aims may be implemented by national legislation or administrative regula-
tion. The Exchange of Therapeutic Substances Agreement"0 4 and Article
5 of the Medical Treatment Convention 1"5 are rendered effective by
national standards. Others are implemented by prior international agree-
ments, such as Article 4 of the European Agreement on Regulations
Governing the Movement of Persons Between Member States of the
Council of Europe"' and Article 4 of the European Cultural Conven-
tion. °7 Again, this is a case of a clear illustration in which the Council
has emulated 1LO practice.
3. Territorial Application
This very frequently used option permits Members to exclude non-
metropolitan territories in a manner identical to the long line of ILO
Television Films, Europ. T.S. No. 27, art. 5 (1958), which states: "This Agreement shall not
affect the following rights, which shall be entirely reserved:
(a) any moral right recognised in relation to films;
(b) the copyright in literary, dramatic or artistic works from which the television film is
derived;
(c) the copyright in a musical work, with or without words accompanying a television
film;
(d) the copyright in films other than television films;
(e) the copyright in the exploitation of television films otherwise than on television."
104. See note 93 supra.
105. See note 100 supra.
106. Europ. T.S. No. 25 (1957), 315 U.N.T.S. 139, 142. Article 4 of this Convention
appears to be a most favored nation clause. "This Agreement shall not prejudice the pro-
visions of any domestic law and bilateral or multilateral treaties, conventions or agreements
now in force or which may hereafter enter into force, whereby more favourable terms are
applied to the nationals of other Contracting Parties in respect of the crossing of frontiers."
Accord, European Convention on Establishment, Europ. T.S. No. 19, art. 25 (1958), 529
U.N.T.S. 141.
107. Europ. T.S. No. 18 (1958), 218 U.N.T.S. 139. This example is a bit closer. Article
4 of this Convention holds: "Each Contracting Party shall, insofar as may be possible,
facilitate the movement and exchange of persons as well as of objects of cultural value .... "
1971]
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precedent 08 By way of example we may note Article 11 of the European
Agreement Concerning Program Exchanges, 00 or the more developed
(in the sense of being a clear reservation) Article 27 "Territorial Applica-
tion" of the European Convention on Extradition." 0 Article 27 lists pre-
cise territories in addition to a general escalation clause."' Other examples
following ILO practices can be noted." 2 Sadly, the Council has in isolated
instances, such as those cited in the final section, allowed Members to
even exclude portions of their metropolitan territory in order to render
the treaty palatable.
4. Optional or Alternative Provisions
In addition to the aforesaid, Members may incorporate alternatives-
generally speaking, of a more limited nature than the elaborate escalation
clause or negotiated reservations to be discussed in the Conclusions-
rather than assuming all obligations at the time of original ratification.
An illustration can be found in Article 6 of the European Convention on
the International Classification of Patents for Invention,"3 providing that
the Convention shall not enter into force until other specified states have
ratified. Again, the Council has effectively employed a technique originally
developed by ILO.
5. Flexibility and Escalation Clauses
In considering the several varieties of flexibility devices (plus the
numerous types of reservations) it is necessary to evaluate the particular
flexibility technique in relation to the importance of the convention;
108. See Agreement on Military and Civilian War-Disabled, art. 7, supra note 97.
109. Europ. T.S. No. 27, supra note 103.
110. Europ. T.S. No. 24 (1957), 359 U.N.T.S. 274.
111. Article 27 states:
"1. This Convention shall apply to the metropolitan territories of the Contracting Parties.
2. In respect of France, it shall also apply to Algeria and to the overseas Departments and,
in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to the Channel
Islands and to the Isle of Man.
3. The Federal Republic of Germany may extend the application of this Convention to the
Land of Berlin by notice addressed to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, who
shall notify the other Parties of such declaration.
4. By direct arrangement between two or more Contracting Parties, the application of this
Convention may be extended, subject to the conditions laid down in the arrangement, to
any territory of such Parties, other than the territories mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3
of this Article, for whose international relations any such Party is responsible."
112. E.g., The European Convention on the Equivalence of Periods of University Study,
Europ. T.S. No. 21, art. 9 (1956), 278 U.N.T.S. 73; Convention of the Elaboration of a
European Pharmacopoeia, Europ. T.S. No. 50, art. 13 (1964).
113. Europ. T.S. No. 17 (1954-1961), 218 U.N.T.S. 51.
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specifically, the mere frequency of use cannot be the primary considera-
tion.
As repeatedly emphasized, the Council has adopted many of the very
sophisticated solutions formerly perfected by ILO, but the most significant
single instance of such adoption is to be found in the European Social
Charter,"' which the writer has previously held to constitute one of the
most important accomplishments of the Council; in fact, he would place
the Social Charter second only to the European Convention of Human
Rights"' in over-all importance.110
The major flexibility device of the European Social Charter is con-
tained in Part 3, Article 20 (1)-(3), as follows:
1. Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes:
(a) to consider Part I of this Charter as a declaration of the aims which it will
pursue by all appropriate means, as stated in the introductory paragraph of that
Part;
(b) to consider itself bound by at least five of the following Articles of Part 11 of
this Charter: Articles 1, 5, 6, 12, 13, 16 and 19;
(c) in addition to the Articles selected by it in accordance with the preceding sub-
paragraph, to consider itself bound by such a number of Articles or numbered
paragraphs of Part II of the Charter as it may select, provided that the total num-
ber of Articles or numbered paragraphs by which it is bound is not less than 10
Articles or 45 numbered paragraphs.
2. The Articles or paragraphs selected in accordance with sub-paragraphs (b) and (c)
of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be notified to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe at the time when the instrument of ratification or approval of
the Contracting Party concerned is deposited.
3. Any Contracting Party may, at a later date, declare by notification to the Secretary-
General that it considers itself bound by any Articles or any numbered paragraphs
of Part II of the Charter which it has not already accepted under the terms of
paragraph 1 of this Article. Such undertakings subsequently given shall be deemed
to be an integral part of the ratification or approval, and shall have the same effect
as from the thirtieth day after the date of the notification.11 7
As in the ILO, a specified number of designated articles-or parts-
must be accepted, thereby establishing a minimum standard. At a later
date additional optional parts may be adhered to.
It needs to be stressed here that much of the preparatory work in
drawing up the Social Charter actually took place in Geneva. The Social
Division collaborated very closely with the larger ILO. This reliance on
114. See note 89 supra.
115. Europ. T.S. No.5 (1950-1952), 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
116. Gormley, supra note 82, at 87-91; A. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe 140-SO;
(1963). See also Gormley, supra note 13, at 312-16; Tennfjord, The European Social Charter
-An Instrument of Social Collaboration in Europe, 9 Europ. Y.B. 71 (1962).
117. Europ. T.S. No. 35, art. 20 (1-3) (1961), 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (emphasis added).
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ILO experience is very forcefully brought out in Article 20(4) of the
Charter, requiring reports by the Secretary-General of the Council to
the Director-General of ILO, and in connection with Article 20(5) which
requires a system of labour inspection. Similarly, Article 21 setting forth
a system of bi-yearly reports represents a duplication of ILO enforce-
ment." 8
Article 34, "Territorial Application," Article 36, "Amendments," and
Article 37, "Denunciation," permit variation from the substantive rights
set forth in Part I of the Social Charter. Moreover, additional flexibility
devices are contained in the Appendix to the Social Charter. As is true
of a substantial number of European Conventions, the annexes are
deemed to constitute part of the Convention, and their provisions allow
a possible modification of the treaty text. The writer is of the opinion
that such annexes represent an adoption of ILO options, since they are
not always true reservations. Indeed, some annexes do not modify the
treaty to which they are attached."" On the other hand, an even larger
number of instances do exist in which the annexes constitute true reserva-
tions. 2 Consequently, these frequently used attachments must not be
overlooked. This conclusion is particularly important when possible mod-
ification of the Social Charter is contemplated, because definite limita-
tions are placed on the interpretation of the Convention's articles.12'
Admittedly, it is difficult to draw a sharp division between flexibility
devices-an alternative to reservations-and the negotiated reservations,
118. For other articles duplicating ILO practice in the European Social Charter, see
arts. 22-26. In addition, art. 31, "Restrictions," is closer to ILO alternative devices than tile
negotiated reservation. These restrictions do not appear to constitute true reservations.
For an excellent discussion concerning the influence of ILO on subsequent organizations,
plus principles of customary law developed by ILO, see C. Alexandrowicz, World Economic
Agencies: Law and Practice chs. 1-3 (1962). Through municipal law and practice ILO stan-
dards arise as principles of international law. Id. at 63.
119. E.g., Interpretation of the terms "Nationals" and "Territory" in the European
Interim Agreement on Social Security Other Than Schemes for Old Age, Invalidity and
Survivors, Europ. T.S. No. 13 (1953), 218 U.N.T.S. 153 [hereinafter cited as European
Agreement on Social Security] and European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance,
Europ. T.S. No. 14 (1953), 218 U.N.T.S. 255.
120. E.g., annex III to the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance and
Protocol; annex III to the European Interim Agreement on Social Security.
Even clearer examples are to be found in two recent Conventions. Major negotiated reser-
vations are set forth in the annex to the European Convention on the Supervision of Con-
ditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released Offenders, Europ. T.S. No. 51 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Convention on Conditionally Released Offenders] and in annex II to the
European Convention on the Punishment of Road Traffic Offences, Europ. T.S. No. 52
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Traffic Offences].
121. See appendix to the Social Charter.
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for most conventions are not as clearly directed toward ILO practice
as the Social Charter. However, this intermediate stage-still in use-is
evident in other treaties, wherein considerable flexibility is permitted.
But here the Members have not gone so far as to interpose reservations.
To illustrate, the Agreement on the Exchange of War Cripples Between
Member Countries of the Council of Europe With a View to Medical
Treatment,' 2 and the European Agreement on Travel by Young Persons
on Collective Passports Between Member Countries of the Council of
Europe, are capable of subsequent improvement.
The Council has utilized the prior experience and precedent of ILO;
further, its close working arrangements, especially between the Social
Division and ILO 24 will tend to perpetuate the use of similar solutions.
Regardless of the unique types of reservations subsequently developed
by the Council, some examples of flexibility devices, escalation clauses,
plus the other more restrictive alternatives discussed will remain. Often
these more limited alternatives will be used as supplements to more
elaborate reservation articles.
E. The Emergence of Negotiated Reservations
The alternatives to reservations originally perfected by ILO and later
carried forward by the Council of Europe have one unique quality (or
distinguishing feature). All acceptable modifications from the treaty text
have been agreed to in advance of signature. Thus, subsequent disputes,
such as those encountered by the United Nations and OAS, are avoided.
Moreover, this scheme of prior negotiation has resulted in a new form
of reservation. This is to say, the diverse "alternatives" short of reserva-
tions subsequently evolved into a fully matured norm of treaty law. While
interesting in their own right from an academic standpoint and still em-
ployed in Geneva and Strasbourg, these alternatives short of reservations
should more properly be thought of as stages in the evolution of treaty
law.
1. Simple Reservations
In its simplest form the negotiated reservation appears to be very sim-
ilar (and in some cases almost identical) to the exception originally found
in IL0 Conventions. In fact, the difference may only be evident in the
jurisprudential approach taken rather than in the functional effect of the
item in question. In any event, a relatively short article or sub-paragraph
122. Europ. T.S. No. 20, art. 1 (1955), 250 U.N.T.S. 3.
123. Europ. T.S. No. 37, art. 13 (1961), 544 U.N.T.S. 19.
124. See Council of Europe, European Co-operation in 1962, at 90-149 (1963).
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merely says that some phase need not be accepted at ratification. Only
those items set forth in the particular article can be reserved. For ex-
ample, Article 7 of the European Convention Relating to the Formalities
Required for Patent Applications'25 maintains: "Each Contracting State,
however, reserves the right to prescribe that this declaration should be
made within the priority period laid down by that Convention.""12 Addi-
tional examples of simple type reservations can be cited. 7 They have
been deemed to be compatible with the essential aim and purpose of the
Convention. To illustrate, Article 1(3) of the European Convention on
the Equivalence of Diplomas Leading to Admission to Universities"2 ,
contains a simple reservation allowing a state to vary the requirements
as to its own nationals as follows: "Each Contracting Party reserves the
right not to apply the provisions of paragraph 1 ... to its own nationals"
(the recognition of equivalent foreign diplomas).
Simple variations of this type can also be found in conventions contain-
ing a longer list of enumerated items that can be excluded, as does Article
3 of the European Agreement on the Protection of Television Broad-
casts. 129 This instrument is even more significant because of the inclu-
sion of a territorial clause in Article 12, by which the Convention can
later be extended to non-metropolitan areas. An example of a reservation
a bit higher on the scale is to be seen in the Agreement Relating to Appli-
cation of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbi-
125. Europ. T.S. No. 16 (1953), 218 U.N.T.S. 27 [hereinafter cited as European Con-
vention for Patent Applications].
126. Id. art. 7.
127. Admittedly, some variation exists as to the following Conventions but collectively
they do represent illustrations of negotiated reservations not incorporating elaborate flexibility
devices: European Interim Agreement on Social Security, art. 6; The European Convention
on the Academic Recognition of University Qualifications, Europ. T.S. No. 32 (1959), 444
U.N.T.S. 193.
A single exception, typically relating to internal "ordre public, security or public health"
is contained in the European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas For Refugees, Europ. T.S.
No. 31, art. 7 (1959), 376 U.N.T.S. 85 (emphasis deleted). Cf. the simple reservation set
forth in Article 3 (in conjunction with Article 4, permitting higher national standards in a
manner similar to ILO practice) in the Agreement on the Temporary Importation, Free of
Duty, of Medical, Surgical and Laboratory Equipment for Use on Free Loan in Hospitals
and Other Medical Institutions For Purposes of Diagnosis or Treatment, Europ. T.S. No. 33
(1960), 376 U.N.T.S. 111. Numerous "simple reservation clauses" are used in connection with
other devices in the more recent Conventions of a complicated nature. See, e.g., European
Agreement For the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted From Stations Outside National
Territories, Europ. T.S. No. 53, arts. 3 & 4 (1965), 634 U.N.T.S. - [hereinafter cited as
European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts].
128. See note 95 supra. Article 1(3) concerns the recognition of equivalent foreign
diplomas.
129. Europ. T.S. No. 34 (1960), 546 U.N.T.S. 247.
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tration °30 The validity of prior bilateral and multilateral arbitral
agreements is not affected. According to the Preamble (which the writer
equates as a part of the treaty in connection with Article 4) a condition
precedent delaying the entry into force of the Convention is presenLt.1
As indicated previously, 13 2 the condition precedent, standing alone with-
out any other flexibility devices, is not a true reservation in either the ILO
or Council practice. Conversely, when used along with a prior reserva-
tion, the entire treaty has a less definite status, since a type of built-in
veto is present. For instance, in the previously cited Convention on Com-
mercial Arbitration one of the specified powers can prevent the entry into
force of the document merely by withholding its ratification. Likewise, a
single reservation (such as one specifying that national law will be ap-
plied) can very effectively be implemented by several annexes containing
enumerated reservations. An illustration can be seen in the European
Convention on Social and Medical Assistance and the Protocol thereto.1 3
Article 6 (in conjunction with Article 5) of the European Agreement
on Social Security 34 is an even clearer example of an agreed reserva-
tion since Articles 7 to 11 refer to the force of the annexes. According
to Article 10 "[t]he Annexes to this Agreement shall constitute an in-
tegral part of this Agreement."' 3 This same rule applies, nevertheless,
to all annexes accompanying European Conventions.
2. Limitations on the Use of Reservations
Prior examples have indicated areas to which reservations could be at-
tached. However, an equally important corollary is that only those reser-
130. Europ. T.S. No. 42 (1962), 523 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter cited as Convention on
Commercial Arbitration].
131. The Convention on Commercial Arbitration can be further compared with the
European Convention for Patent Applications, art 7. Cf. the condition precedent contained
in the European Convention on the International Classification of Patents for Invention,
Europ. T.S. No. 17, art. 6 (1954), 218 U.N.T.S. 51. A declaration is employed to bring this
condition into operation.
Interestingly, the condition precedent can be clothed in a temporary reservation, suspend-
ing for a limited period of time the entry into force of the treaty. E.g., Convention on the
Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents For Invention, Europ. T.S. No.
47, art. 12 (1963).
132. See note 131 supra.
133. See note 119 supra.
134. See id.
135. See the examples of Conventions incorporating extensive annexes and containing
reservations in notes 119 & 120 supra. See also the long list of reservations set forth in
European Convention on Compulsory Insurance Against Civil Liability In Respect of Motor
Vehicles, Europ. T.S. No. 29, Annex II (1959) [hereinafter cited as the European Conven-
tion on Compulsory Insurance].
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vations specifically agreed to before signature and set forth in the text
of the Convention, in a Protocol, or in an Annex will be permitted.
Usually, this fundamental rule is stated negatively; absolutely no other
reservations will be permittedl A similar rule applies to the simpler flexi-
bility devices employed by both ILO and the Council of Europe. Whereas
ILO has not chosen to set forth this provision in the main text but rather
has relied upon collateral statements to the League and International
Court of Justice, the Council has made the prohibition part of the
treaty itself. Accordingly, it is not unrealistic to refer to these articles as
lawmaking. To illustrate, Article 26 of the European Convention on
Establishment holds: "Reservations of a general nature shall not be
permitted ....," The rule that only previously negotiated reservations
may be attached becomes even clearer when an examination is made of
Conventions drawn up by the Division of Crime Problems. Specifically,
Article 2 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters3 7 sets forth those fields in which national assistance in criminal
cases may be refused, whereas Article 5 permits declarations limiting the
use of letters rogatory. The Division of Crime Problems holds strictly to
the position that no additional reservations may be attached, largely be-
cause of the nature of minimum reform contained in such treaties.
Considering the firm and unyielding position taken by the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe that no additional reservations may be
attached, it does seem a bit surprising that only a couple of instances can
be found wherein such a statement is set forth in the treaty itself. Of
course, the answer seems fairly obvious; this norm is so firmly established
and beyond dispute that such clauses would merely be repetitious and
unduly lengthen the text. This principle of European treaty law is deemed
to be certain, even though a serious challenge has yet to arise. This is to
136. Europ. T.S. No. 19 (1955), 529 U.N.T.S. 141. The full text of Article 26 reads as
follows:
"1. Any Member of the Council of Europe may, when signing this Convention or when
depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular
provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory Is not
in conformity with the said provision. Reservations of a general nature shall not be per-
mitted under this Article.
2. Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief statement of the law con-
cerned.
3. Any member of the Council which makes a reservation under this Article shall with-
draw the said reservation as soon as circumstances permit. Such withdrawal shall be made
by notification addressed to the Secretary-General . . . .The Secretary-General shall trans-
mit the text of this notification to all the Signatories of the Convention." See European
Convention on Establishment of Companies, Europ. T.S. No. 57, art. 7(1) (1966).
137. Europ. T.S. No. 30 (1959), 472 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter cited as Convention on
Criminal Matters].
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say, the Council has not yet faced the situation where a state attempts to
apply a reservation not previously accepted. What will happen in this
event? Will the Secretary-General of the Council follow the practice of
his counterpart in ILO; 138 will he follow the precedent of the Secretary-
General of the League and transmit the reservation to the other prior
signatories (or to every Member of the Council) or merely emulate the
United Nations and act strictly as a depository? Furthermore, what
action will be taken if another state objects to the reservation? Obviously,
definite answers cannot be given at this time. The writer is of the opinion
that ILO practice will be followed because of the basic theory that only
those reservations set forth in the Convention will be allowed; hence,
reservations of a general nature will not be permitted.130 Therefore, such
state will be forced to withdraw its reservation or remain outside of the
Convention. This conclusion seems valid for the immediate future, al-
though a constitutional development could take place that might have
the effect of forcing the Council to move closer to the United Nations
standard. In other words, it is possible that as the Council continues to
deal with very sophisticated and controversial topics, greater discretion
may be demanded by ratifying governments. In any event, only future
controversies and "case law" will be able to firmly establish the superior-
ity of negotiated reservations.
3. Reciprocity
One further limitation on the use of negotiated reservations must be
noted. The doctrine of reciprocity-found in the regional law of the OAS,
but completely lacking as to the alternatives to reservations employed by
ILO-is applicable to reservations attached to some European Conven-
tions.'1 A good illustration can be seen in Article 5(2) of the previously
cited European Convention on Criminal Matters. 4' "Where a Contract-
ing Party makes a declaration in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this
Article, any other party may apply reciprocity."'" In a very unfortunate
manner, Article 35 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settle-
ment of Disputes 43 incorporates self-judging reservations applicable to
the acceptance of jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.'"
138. See note 20 supra.
139. However, understandings and interpretive declarations are proper.
140. Reciprocity could not be applied to undertakings and interpretive declarations
attached to Council and ILO Conventions. Significantly, the doctrine of reciprocity is being
employed in the more recent conventions. E.g., Convention on Traffic Offences, art. 25(4),
supra note 120, which states in part, "Any Contracting Party may claim reciprocity."
141. See note 137 supra.
142. Convention on Criminal Matters, art. 5(2).
143. Europ. T.S. No. 23 (1957), 320 U.N.T.S. 243.
144. Id. art. 35 sets forth the extent of the possible reservation:
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Such reciprocity would never apply to ILO instruments; thus, a
further point of distinction between the two systems becomes clear. In-
sofar as the Council of Europe is concerned, a true reservation is used.
Not only is the reserving state affected, but all others may apply such
reservation against its original user.
F. The Fully Developed Reservation
Any breakdown or subdivision of negotiated reservations must neces-
sarily be somewhat artificial and subject to considerable overlapping,
although certain generalizations can be made as to a select group of Con-
ventions employing a greater degree of flexibility than the simpler devices
discussed in the two prior sections. In the "advanced stage" to be evalu-
ated here, many extremely complicated variations (or levels of accept-
ance) become possible within a single Convention. Rather than one
(or even several) deviations from the main portions of the text, elabo-
rate flexibility and escalation clauses are present. Realistically, the major
distinction between the "various stages" set forth in this study lies in the
quantitative amount of deviation permitted. The more difficult problem
of determining the qualitative factor-primarily the extent to which the
essential object and purpose of the treaty is restricted-can only be con-
sidered in a few pronounced cases, for it is assumed that the essential
object and purpose of the Convention has been determined prior to sig-
nature. And it is further assumed that any possible weakening of this vital
aim has been prohibited by all negotiating states. As in ILO practice,
once the absolute minimum has been determined, deviation will be
allowed as to other sections of the treaty but with the hope that eventu-
ally all states will conform to higher standards. Consequently, the aim
of both the Geneva and Strasbourg groups is similar.
Early in this section the point was made that the importance of the
"1. The High Contracting Parties may only make reservations which exclude from the
application of this Convention disputes concerning particular cases or clearly specified special
matters, such as territorial status, or disputes falling within clearly defined categories. If
one of the High Contracting Parties has made a reservation, the other Parties may enforce
the same reservation in regard to that party.
2. Any reservation made shall, unless otherwise expressly stated, be deemed not to apply to
the procedure of conciliation.
4. If a igh Contracting Party accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice under paragrapb 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the said Court, subject to
reservations, or amends any such reservations, that High Contracting Party may by a simple
declaration, and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, make the
same reservations to this Convention. Such reservations shall not release the High Contract-
ing Party concerned from its obligations under this Convention in respect of disputes relating
to facts or situations prior to the date of the declaration by which they are made . ... "
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Convention to which the reservation is attached must be considered not
just from mere frequency of use. Accordingly, four main groups of im-
portant treaties can be considered together as follows: 1) The European
Social Charter; 4 ' 2) Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and Protocol;"' 3) The Convention on Reduction of Cases of
Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple
Nationality'47 (which possesses the fully developed negotiated reserva-
tion); and 4) the selected group of Conventions discussed below that
clearly contain extremely complicated reservation clauses.
The problem of analysis is somewhat simplified by the fact that the
Social Charter does not contain reservations but instead utilizes ILO
flexibility devices. Furthermore, it has already been indicated that the
most important single Convention is the European Convention of Human
Rights. 48 Though one of the earliest multilateral treaties, the basic
rationale of its reservations was set forth in that each Member had to
specifically ratify particular articles before it could be legally bound.
While regretting the required use of a declaration to implement the very
vital Article 25, which sets forth the right of an individual to petition the
European Commission of Human Rights, a very clear modification of
the Convention has been agreed to beforehand by all signatories. In
the opinion of the writer, the most essential aim and object of the
treaty has been partially defeated; however, the blame must be placed
on those states unwilling to surrender portions of their national sover-
eignty. Pursuant to Article 2 5 (1):
The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of in-
dividuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High Contracting
Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognises the
competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.149
Of course, it may still be asked whether such a declaration is a true
reservation or a lower-type flexibility device. The writer concludes that
it is a reservation (even though a specific declaration is required). The
basis of this conclusion rests on Article 25 (3), under which the declaration
is treated as a true reservation. Article 25(3) states: "The declarations
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
who shall transmit copies thereof to the High Contracting Parties and
145. See note 89 supra.
146. Europ. T.S. No. 5 (1950), 213 U.N.TS. 221 [hereinafter cited as European
Convention of Human Rights].
147. See note 90 supra.
148. Cited in note 146 supra.
149. European Convention of Human Rights, art. 25(1) (emphasis added).
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publish them."'5° By following this procedure of notification, the Secre-
tary-General of the Council is functioning as a depository in the same
fashion as the Secretary-General of the United Nations. An identical
requirement is incorporated in Article 46 in that a declaration is required
in order for the state to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights; further, under Article 46(3): "These
declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council
of Europe who shall transmit copies thereof to the High Contracting
Parties." Repeatedly, declarations limiting the implementation of a
treaty are handled as true reservations by the depository. Therefore, it
is valid to conclude that they Junction as reservations and not the more
limited unilateral declarations employed in international law. This test of
looking to the practices of the Secretary-General can be applied to a
number of other Conventions in order to show that the clause in question
constitutes a full reservation. For example, Article 13 of the European
Convention on Compulsory Insurance' requires notification to the other
Contracting Parties by the Secretary-General." 2 As is true of the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights, Article 13 adheres to the League and
United Nations procedure, insofar as notice to the Secretary-General
"of its precise proposal" (plus his duty to notify the other parties) is
concerned. 53
Continuing with the summation of the European Convention of Human
Rights, other sections-aside from the tragic Article 25-contain reserva-
tions. While some question can legitimately be raised, the writer classifies
Articles 15-18 54 -limiting the application of the substantive rights set
forth in Articles 2 to 14-as agreed reservations because they "contain
terms which will limit the effect of the treaty."' 5 Article 15 permits states
to derogate from their obligations under the Convention during a time of
war or other public emergency; however, paragraph 2 limits such sus-
pension of rights, whereas paragraph 3 requires full notification of such
150. Id. art. 25(3).
151. See note 135 supra.
152. Id. art. 13(1) provides: "If, after the entry into force of the Convention in respect
of a Contracting Party, that Party deems it necessary to make a reservation, either not
provided for in Annex II to this Convention or, if provided for in that Annex, a reservation
which it has not made previously or has withdrawn, it shall inform the Secretary-General
of the Council of Europe of its precise proposal, of which the Secretary-General shall then
notify the other Contracting Parties."
153. Note the very elaborate set of possible reservations contained in id., Annex II. The
total effect of the numerous devices contained in this treaty renders it a very sophisticated
example of the use of reservations by the Council.
154. See Robertson, supra note 116, at 39-42.
155. See Bishop, supra note 5, at 249-65. See also Harvard Research, supra note 17, at
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derogation to the Secretary-General. Consequently, Article 15 functions
as a reservation, not a flexibility device. Article 16 protects the Members
against political activity by aliens, and Article 17 guards the states
against "political" activity aimed at their destruction. Finally, Article
18 maintains: "The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the
said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any other purpose than
those for which they have been prescribed." Here, then, a major limitation
has been placed on the reservation in question. The writer classifies
Article 18 as a further reservation under the broad definition being used,
in spite of the fact that it merely complements Articles 15-17.
Article 63-in a very interesting manner-.-combines the typical co-
lonial-type clause providing for extension of the Convention to non-metro-
politan territories (really a simple flexibility device) with a clear
reservation. In short, Article 25, by reference, governs all four para-
graphs of Article 63. The fully negotiated reservation comes forth in
Article 64(1), which states: "Any State may, when signing this Conven-
tion or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation
in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent
that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the
provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted
M 56
Thus, in the European Convention on Human Rights, one of the earliest
Conventions, the negotiated reservation emerged but with one limitation
not found in the later examples to be cited below. This Convention does
not contain elaborate escalation clauses allowing a great deal of flexibility.
Only affirmative and negative choices are offered. The precise reason for
such restriction is obvious. A treaty guaranteeing fundamental human
rights cannot permit a great deal of variation (as can a labour conven-
tion) and still possess the required legal force. The guarantees contained
in Articles 2 to 14, along with the general aims set forth in the Preamble,
constitute the lowest acceptable minimum. Precisely, their integrity must
not be restricted by general reservations, since Articles 2 to 14 constitute
binding legal rights and duties capable of effective enforcement, not sim-
ply broad statements of ideals. Sadly, the negotiating governments still
obtained far more "reserving competence" than the substantive rights
required. The writer feels that the essential object of the Convention was
weakened by "realistic negotiation," since ratification had to be obtained
from the Member States, determined to protect their national sover-
eignty.
The same problems-and similar-type solutions-are evident in Proto-
156. European Convention of Human Rights, art. 64(1) (emphasis added).
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col Number Four to the Convention of Human Rights.157 Protocol Num-
ber Four represents a more advanced stage because of the fact that quite
a bit of modification is permitted.15 8 Article 2 (4) holds: "The rights set
forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, in particular areas, to restric-
tions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public interest
in a democratic society."'5 9 Such language constitutes an agreed reserva-
tion instead of an amendment. By definition, the writer has repeatedly
treated a "restriction" as an agreed reservation.60° Moreover, Article 5
contains a clause permitting extensions to non-metropolitan areas and also
the subsequent termination as to these territories.
As indicated in the prior examination of ILO, such termination pro-
visions as to territories are used much less frequently than the typical
colonial clauses providing for a later extension. In the case of the Council
of Europe, broad discretion allowing complete withdrawal is required to
pacify those major European powers experiencing difficulty with nation-
alistic movements. Again, the writer concludes that for reasons of political
expediency the essential aim of the Convention has been modified in
order to obtain wider participation, and he favors the use of reservations
in order to obtain at least some level of acceptance, as a starting point.
After all, the practice of reserving was originally perfected for the pur-
pose of meeting situations of this type.
Another illustration is evident. Article 6 incorporates by reference the
restrictive Articles 25 and 46 of the European Convention of Human
Rights.'' Indeed, Articles 5 and 6 can also be treated as restrictions be-
cause of the unfortunate effect imposed upon the implementation of the
human rights contained in Articles 1 to 4 of the Protocol. The variation
from the rights set forth in the Convention of Human Rights and Proto-
cols is considerable; yet the development of negotiated reservations be-
comes even clearer at such time as the Protocols are equated with the
main document.
157. Europ. T.S. No. 46 (1963).
158. See Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of Human Rights, Europ. T.S. No. 9 (1952),
213 U.N.T.S. 262 which contains some of the devices used in the Parent Convention, but
sheds no further light upon the question under examination here.
159. Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention of Human Rights, Europ. T.S. No. 46,
art. 2(4) (1963).
160. E.g., European Social Charter, art. 31.
161. Article 6(2) maintains: "[Tihe right of individual recourse recognized by a declara-
tion made under Article 25 of the Convention, or the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court by a declaration made under Article 46 of the Convention, shall not be
effective in relation to this Protocol unless the High Contracting Party concerned has made a
statement recognizing such right, or accepting such jurisdiction, in respect of all or any of
Articles 1 to 4 of the Protocol."
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G. Fully Matured Reservations
In its most advanced stage the negotiated reservation in one sense
moves back toward the escalating concept of ILO in that considerable
variation beyond the minimum obligation is permitted; it is necessary
for the plenipotentiaries to establish minimum duties standing a reason-
able chance of adoption. At the very least the required number of
ratifications must be obtained in order to bring the particular treaty
into force; but, as seen in the above examination of the Convention
of Human Rights and Protocols, some articles require a specific declara-
tion of acceptance rather than a mere rejection. Fortunately, such pro-
visions are relatively rare. Conversely, the more advanced conventions
employ an extensive series of options as can be seen in Article 2 of the
Convention on the Liability of Hotel-Keepers Concerning the Property
of Their Guests. 62
Each Contracting Party retains the option:
(a) notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article I of the Annex, to limit
the liability of the hotel-keeper to at least 100 times the daily charge for the room;
(b) notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Annex, to limit
the liability in respect of any one article to an amount which is not less than the
equivalent of 1,500 gold francs or, where the preceding paragraph of this article ap-
plies, to a minimum of 50 times the daily charge for the room;
(c) to adopt the rule laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Annex only in
respect of property which is at the hotel;
(d) notwithstanding the provisions of Article 6 of the Annex, to permit hotel-keepers
to reduce their liability, in cases to which paragraph 1(a) of Article 2 or Article 4 of
the Annex apply, not being cases where intent ... is involved, by an agreement with
the guest signed by him and containing no other terms; the liability of the hotel-
keeper may not, however, be reduced to an amount which is less than that provided
in the relevant legislation enacted in pursuance of this Convention;
(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Article 7 of the Annex, to apply the rules in
the Annex to vehicles, property left with them and live animals, or to regulate the
hotel-keeper's liability in this respect in any other way.
In short, these optional and alternative devices (more sophisticated than
the earlier types used by ILO) are set forth in specialized articles or in
accompanying protocols and annexes. Additional discretion is present.
Article 3(1) establishes the rule that the "Convention shall apply to the
metropolitan territories .... ."I' but paragraph 2 permits a declaration ex-
cluding such areas. This use of the "declaration" represents an advance-
ment over the older-type colonial clause originally developed by ILO in
162. Europ. T.S. No. 41 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Hotel Keepers].
163. Id. art. 3(1).
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that the Convention automatically applies unless the agreed to reserva-
tion is attached at signature or at ratification.'
The precise variations permitted are further spelled out in Annex I, as
can be seen from a reading of Article 2 reproduced above. Here, the full
impact of a more detailed Annex can be seen. In the earlier cited An-
nexes " 5 less extensive definitions were included. Nonetheless, the evolu-
tion of the negotiated reservation is driven home very forcefully from an
examination of such Annexes; the European Treaty Series can never
be accurately appraised without consideration being given to these sup-
plemental documents.
The fully matured negotiated reservation emerges in the previously
cited Convention of Cases of Multiple Nationality.100 Article 8(1) is one
of the best examples of a fully matured negotiated reservation. "Any Con-
tracting Party may, when signing this Convention or depositing its instru-
ment of ratification, acceptance or accession, declare that it avails itself
of one or more of the reservations provided for in the Annex to the pres-
ent Convention. No other reservation shall be permitted."'07 Further-
more, Article 8(1) is serving as the prototype of future reservations
clauses.
The most advanced (and by far the most complicated) Convention
available to the writer is the European Code of Social Security and Pro-
tocol to the European Code of Social Security.' This code has been
chosen-perhaps somewhat arbitrarily-because it incorporates a larger
number of flexibility devices that appear to be very similar to ILO
criteria, but they are used alongside negotiated reservations, particularly in
Articles 3 and 6. Article 3 states: "Each Contracting Party shall specify in
its instrument of ratification those Parts of Parts II to X in respect of
which it accepts the obligations of this Code, and shall also state whether
and to what extent it avails itself of the provisions of Article 2, para-
graph 2."119 Not only is a state permitted to reserve specified sections not
164. The spirit of this very important Convention is carried even further in Article S.
"The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe may invite any State not a Member
of the Council to accede to this Convention." Even though not strictly a reservation, it
certainly permits a wider adherence than is found in practically all other such instruments,
limited to Members.
165. See note 120 supra. Unfortunately, the length of the Annex precludes its repro-
duction here.
166. See note 90 supra.
167. Id. art. 8(1). For a further example of a fully matured negotiated reservation, see
European Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitration, Europ. T.S. No. 56, art.
8(1) (1966).
168. Europ. T.S. No. 48 (1964), 648 U.N.T.S. - [hereinafter cited as European Code of
Social Security].
169. Id. art. 3.
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encompassing the essential aim and purpose, but it has the higher affirma-
tive duty of clearly spelling out those portions of the Code it accepts and
rejects. The influence of Articles 35 and 46 of the Convention of Human
Rights can be seen. Consequently, it is not unrealistic to conclude that
reservations eventually reach a stage at which they also function as
reporting devices, especially when periodic reports are required from the
Secretary-General to the Director-General of ILO as will be shown in
Article 74(4)-(5) below. In short, any really effective escalation concept
must be implemented by supervision. The ILO recognized this truism
early in its existence; the Council of Europe is also including such sup-
porting machinery within its emerging legal order. Furthermore, an ap-
proach similar to that of Article 3 is used in the agreed reservation in
Article 6, which states:
For the purpose of compliance with Parts II, III, IV, V, VIII (in so far as it relates
to medical care), IX or X of this Code, a Contracting Party may take account of
protection effected by means of insurance which, although not made compulsory by
national laws or regulations for the persons to be protected,
(a) is subsidised by the public authorities or, where such insurance is complementary
only, is supervised by the public authorities or administered, in accordance with
prescribed standards, by joint operation of employers and workers;
(b) covers a substantial part of the persons whose earnings do not exceed those of
the skilled manual male employee, determined in accordance with Article 65; and
(c) complies, in conjunction with other forms of protection, where appropriate, with
the relevant provisions of the Code.170
Before continuing with the analysis of advanced reservations, it seems
wise to first consider a basic portion of the Treaty, namely Article 2, for
the reason that a conventional escalation clause is set forth, and the
similarity to ILO criteria is apparent. Article 2(1) maintains:
1. Each Contracting Party shall comply with:
(a) Part I;
(b) At least six of parts II to X, provided that Part II shall count as two Parts
and Part V as three Parts;
(c) The relevant provisions of Parts XI and XII; and
(d) Part Xrr.171
Additional escalation is contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 2.7 -
170. Id. art. 6.
171. Id. art. 2(1).
172. Articles 2(2) & (3) provide:
"2. The terms of sub-paragraph (b) of the foregoing paragraph can be regarded as ful-
filled if:
(a) at least three of Parts II to X, including at least one of Parts IV, V, VI, IX, and X
are complied with; and
(b) in addition, proof is furnished that the social security legislation in force is equivalent
to one of the combinations provided for in that sub-paragraph, taking into account:
(i) the fact that certain branches covered by sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph exceed
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Article 2, as can be determined from a reading of Articles 3 and 6,
serves as the basis for the agreed reservations. This example is significant
because of the interplay between the escalation clauses and the reserva-
tion articles . 3 The future escalation up to higher levels is set forth in
Article 4(1). "Each Contracting Party may subsequently notify the Sec-
retary-General that it accepts the obligations of the Code in respect of
one or more of Parts II to X not already specified in its ratification."'7 4
Again the ILO device is copied. Part II, "Medical Care," likewise con-
tains limitations on the applicability of the Convention; such agreed-to
restrictions are similar to ILO practices.7 5 Part XII of this long instru-
ment sets forth an elaborate negotiated reservation in Article 68.
A benefit to which a person protected would otherwise be entitled in compliance
with any of Parts II to X of this Code may be suspended to such extent as may be
prescribed:
(a) as long as the person concerned is absent from the territory of the Contracting
Party concerned;
(b) as long as the person concerned is maintained at public expense, or at the expense
of a social security institution or service, subject to a portion of the benefit being
granted to the dependents of the beneficiary;
(c) as long as the person concerned is in receipt of another social security cash
benefit, other than a family benefit, and during any period in respect of which he is
indemnified for the contingency by a third party, subject to the part of the benefit
which is suspended not exceeding the other benefit or the indemnity by a third party;
(d) where the person concerned has made a fraudulent claim;
the standards of the Code in respect of their scope of protection or their level of benefits, or
both; (ii) the fact that certain branches covered by sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph
exceed the standards of the Code by granting supplementary services of advantages listed In
Addendum 2; and (iii) branches which do not attain the standards of the Code.
3. A Signatory desiring to avail itself of the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of this Article
shall make a request to this effect in the report to the Secretary-General submitted in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article 78. The Committee, basing itself on the principle of
equivalence of cost, shall lay down rules co-ordinating and defining the conditions for taking
into account the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of this Article. These provisions may only be
taken into account in each case with the approval of the Committee, the decision to be
taken by a two-thirds majority."
173. In this regard, see id. art. 80(2) which provides for extension to non-metropolitan
territories.
174. Id. art. 4(1). Article 4(2) supplements the above: "The undertakings referred to In
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be deemed to be an integral part of the ratification and to
have the force of ratification as from the date of notification." See also id. art. S.
175. Part II, art. 9 provides:
"The persons protected shall comprise:
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent of all em-
ployees, and also their wives and children; or
(b) prescribed classes of the economically active population, constituting not les than
20 per cent of all residents, and also their wives and children; or
(c) prescribed classes of residents, constituting not less than S0 per cent of all residents."
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(e) where the contingency has been caused by a criminal offense committed by the
person concerned;
(f) where the contingency has been caused by the wilful misconduct of the person
concerned;
(g) in appropriate cases, where the person concerned neglects to make use of the
medical or rehabilitation services placed at his disposal or fails to comply with rules
prescribed for verifying the occurrence or continuance of the contingency or for the
conduct of the beneficiaries;
(h) in the case of unemployment benefit, where the person concerned has failed to
make use of the employment services placed at his disposal;
(i) in the case of unemployment benefit, where the person concerned has lost his
employment as a direct result of a stoppage of work due to a trade dispute, or has left
it voluntarily without just cause; and
(j) in the case of survivors' benefit, as long as the widow is living with a man as
his wife.176
The writer submits that this extensive category-applied in conjunc-
tion with the elaborate reporting requirements contained in Article 742"
-not only shows the degree to which flexibility devices can be used but
also the emergence of the very complicated and matured reservation. By
specifying reports to the Secretary-General of the Council, supervision
and enforcement are assured. This duplication of one of the most effective
ILO procedures-instead of relying upon the existing enforcement organ
of the Council, the Committee of Ministers-illustrates the reliance on
the Geneva standards. Furthermore, Article 74(4)-(5) requires addi-
tional reports to ILO, plus close cooperation between the two groups.
Article 79 represents a seldom used option, namely that "the Committee
of Ministers may invite any non-member State of the Council of Europe
176. Id. art. 68.
177. Id. art. 74(1) states: "Each Contracting Party shall submit to the Secretary-General
an annual report concerning the application of this Code."
178. Id. art. 74(4)-(S) states:
"(4). The Secretary-General shall send to the Director-General of the International Labour
Office the report and further information submitted in accordance with paragraphs 1 and
2 of this Article respectively, and shall request the latter to consult the appropriate body of
the International Labour Organisation with regard to the said report and further information
and to transmit to the Secretary-General the conclusions reached by such body.
"(5). Such report and further information and the conclusions of the body of the Inter-
national Labour Organisation referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article shall be examined
by the Committee which shall submit to the Committee of Anisters a report containing its
conclusions."
In addition, Article 82 specifies additional reports that must be sent to the Director-
General of ILO. Indeed, the full effect of the reporting devices could constitute the subject
of further research; therefore, may it be suggested that further investigation into the con-
tinued cooperation between ILO and the Council will prove to be of great value as to several
areas, including not only ILO-Council relations but the larger problem of cooperation be-
tween various institutions. See note 124 supra.
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to accede to the Code."'179 In view of Article 74(4)-(5), it would appear
that ILO members will be encouraged to accede to this instrument. At the
very least, this language certainly anticipates unusually wide acceptance.
Article 80(1) specifies that the Convention shall apply to its met-
ropolitan territory, but with one very important reservation: "Each
Contracting Party may .. . specify, by declaration addressed to the
Secretary-General, the territory which shall be considered to be its met-
ropolitan territory for this purpose."1 0 Therefore, a nationality standard
has been incorporated for the benefit of major powers-especially France
-recently experiencing trouble in some overseas areas considered to con-
stitute part of the Mother Country. Without question Article 80(1)
presents a very dramatic example of a negotiated reservation incorpo-
rated for the purpose of pacifying a major power; still the writer wonders
whether the integrity of the treaty has been preserved. He feels that the
prime concern of the plenipotentiaries was to obtain the widest possible
acceptance, with the result that a realistic but "lower standard" had to
be adopted. Therefore, Article 80 shows the extreme limits to which the
High Contracting Parties can employ reservations in order to achieve at-
tainable ends. Accommodations to the vital interests of states prevent
deadlocks of the type experienced by the United Nations. At the regional
level, more limited objectives, having a possibility of adoption, are set
forth in the treaty. Such approach has, sadly, not been tried by the
larger United Nations.
Article 80(2) encourages a member state to "extend [coverage] to any
part of its metropolitan territory not specified under paragraph 1 of this
Article or to any of the other territories for whose international relations it
is responsible. Modifications specified in such notification may be cancelled
or amended by subsequent notification."'' The third paragraph of Article
80 gives a national government the very important option to "denounce
the Code in accordance with Article 81 ... to any part of its metropolitan
territory or to any of the other territories to which the Code has been
extended .... ,' 82 As already discussed, the above withdrawal provision
represents a major reserved power in the hands of any government; con-
sequently, only a few scattered examples are to be found in the sixty-nine
Conventions of the Council or in the one hundred and forty ILO Con-
179. Id. art. 79(1). A very similar provision but one that requires a unanimous vote by
the Committee of Ministers is contained in the European Agreement on the Abolition of
Visas For Refugees, art. 10, supra note 127. The use of this option becomes very clear In two
later Conventions, namely, Convention on Conditionally Released Offenders, art. 35, and
Convention on the Elaboration of a European Pharmacopoeia, art. 12.
180. European Code of Social Security, art. 80(1).
181. Id. art. 80(2).
182. Id. art. 80(3).
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ventions, for the reason that any minimum legal order can be subverted.
Even greater danger lies in the possibility that the number of ratifications
may fall below the minimum required to bring the Convention into force.
It should be stressed, even if reluctantly, that instances of subsequent
termination have been inserted into both the ILO and Council Conven-
tions. At the very least, the prestige of these Conventions may be dras-
tically weakened.
The Protocol follows the same approach as the Code, using extensive
escalation clauses to supplement reservations. Actually, the Protocol
could be analyzed here by way of further illustration, but the discussion
would tend to become repetitious. Suffice to say, such analysis would
strengthen the above conclusions. 18
Aside from the observations already offered, a further conclusion be-
comes desirable: the incorporation of extensive reservations and escalation
clauses, along with attached protocols and annexes, can produce a very
complicated document. Realistically, a longer period of time will be re-
quired for the maximum standards to be accepted than would normally
be the case with the simpler multilateral convention analyzed earlier in
the study. And, it is not without significance that the Code and its Pro-
tocol (and indeed the European Social Charter) had to be implemented
by elaborate reporting devices that confer supervisory authority on the
Secretary-General. Insofar as the Code is concerned, reports are also
submitted to ILO. Therefore, in its most elaborate Convention the Coun-
cil has, first, emulated ILO procedures and, second, sought to work very
closely with this specialized agency of the United Nations. Unfortunately,
a sufficient number of Conventions employing similar reporting techniques
do not exist at present, with the result that any conclusions must be
highly speculative, particularly in view of the fact that the Social Charter
(the other major example) has only been in force for ten years. How-
ever, by way of tentative hypothesis, there seems to be a possible corre-
lation between the sophistication of the instrument and the need for
reporting devices. In effect, then, the emergence of complicated negotiated
reservations, employing escalation concepts, is giving rise to additional
problems, which subsequently could have a major impact not only on the
Office of the Secretary-General but on other organs of the Council.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The most difficult, but fortunately far from the most important ques-
tion is what are the precise differences between the treaty law of ILO
and Council of Europe? Clearly, in theory at least, they are completely
183. See Protocol To the European Code of Social Security, § I, arts. 1, 2, 4, 80, 81;
§ IV, arts. 1 & 2.
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contrary. The former permits absolutely no reservations of any type;
and the Director-General consistently reiterates his position at the time
ILO's Conventions are registered with the United Nations, whereas
the latter has developed a unique system of negotiated reservations.
While at the outset, a purely subjective test will support the above con-
clusion, an objective test of the selected treaty texts set forth in this
paper leads to a somewhat contrary conclusion. 184 Specifically, the practice
of the two groups appears to be very similar and in some instances
identical. However, at its more advanced stages the negotiated reserva-
tion constitutes a clear departure from ILO practicel Still, one very basic
rule remains identical as to both institutions; reservations of a general
nature will not be permittedl Of course, the previously accepted reser-
vations and extension clauses contained in the treaty are not limited.188
Only new reservations are completely prohibited. It is submitted that
this basic point of departure still represents a great deal more than a
mere difference in semantics or even jurisprudence.
Aside from the subjective analysis of basic theory, one very revealing
objective test can be used-namely, the role of the Secretary-General of
the Council in dealing with reservations, declarations, understandings,
etc.18 6 As indicated in the main portion of this study, 87 in numerous in-
stances the Depository treats the "declaration" as a reservation. He
notifies the Members of the existence of any such statements. Additional
support for this conclusion can be found in recent Conventions, especially
those deemed to constitute very advanced and sophisticated instru-
ments.88 The role of the Secretary-General pursuant to the Code of
Social Security has been noted at some length.8 9 Subsequent illustrations
appear in the European Treaty Series: 1) Protocol to the European Con-
184. One very useful objective test can be seen in the following practice of ILO. In
registering a convention with the United Nations, pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter, the
certificate is always attached by ILO "that the ratifications of the conventions are not subject
to any reservations instead of in the form of a statement that the text registered Includes
all reservations made by the parties." Memo, para. 22, at 232. Memo, para. 23 distinguishes
declarations, understandings, and flexibility devices. Cf. note 186 infra.
185. E.g., Convention on the elaboration of a European Pharmacopoeia, arts. 11, 12(3).
186. The use of understandings by the Council of Europe would constitute a separate
study. Limited space precludes an examination similar to that made of ILO procedures. The
reason for this seemingly unequal treatment is to be found in the fact that several ILO
understandings, especially those attached by the United States Senate (see Part I of this
article, pp. 78-79 supra) were deemed by the writer to constitute reservations. Such examples
have not yet been discovered in European practice, since such data is not available; however,
a separate examination of understandings short of negotiated reservations could prove to
be extremely helpful.
187. See text accompanying notes 150-53 supra.
188. In particular, see notes 168-82 supra.
189. See note 178 supra.
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vention on the Equivalence of Diplomas Leading to Admission to Uni-
versities, Article 2;190 2) Convention on the Elaboration of a European
Pharmocopoeia, Article 15; 191 3) European Convention on Conditionally
Released Offenders, Article 40; 92 4) Convention on Traffic Offenses,
Article 34; 111 5) European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts,
Article 13.194
The above cited Article 34 of the European Convention on Traffic
Offenses provides an excellent illustration as follows:
The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member States of the
Council and any State which has acceded to this Convention, of:
(a) any signature;
(b) any deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession;
(c) any date of entry into force of this Convention in accordance with Article 29
thereof;
(d) any notification or declaration received in pursuance of the provisions of para-
graph 4 of Article 15, of paragraph 2 of Article 19, of paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5
of Article 25, of paragraph 2 of Article 27 and of paragraph 4 of Article 32;
(e) any declaration received in pursuance of the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Article 31;
(f) any reservation made in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 32;(g) the withdrawal of any reservation carried out in pursuance of the provisions of
paragraph 2 of Article 32;
(h) any notification received in pursuance of the provisions of Article 33, and the
date on which denunciation takes effect.
When compared against ILO procedures, 1 the above articles present
the clearest objective or extrinsic proof of the basic difference between
alternatives to reservations as opposed to true reservations.9 0 In other
words, these articles are treated as full reservations and not as simpler
alternatives. The writer, therefore, places considerable authority on the
internal practices of the institution. The same approach is used toward
ILO.
The most important and vital issue in this study concerns the function
of "alternatives" and "true reservations." All of these devices have the
common objective of the solution of the seemingly unresolvable problem
of maintaining the integrity of the treaty, while at the same time obtain-
ing maximum participation. Consequently, the writer concludes that in
190. Europ. T.S. No. 49 (1964), supra note 95.
191. See note 179 supra.
192. See Id.
193. See note 120 supra.
194. See note 127 supra; accord, Protocol to the European Agreement on the Protection
of Television Broadcasts, note 92 supra.
195. See note 184 supra.
196. But cf. Minimum Standards Convention, art. 80(3), supra note 46, for an eample
of a possible ILO reservation.
19711
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the first instance the Council of Europe has frequently borrowed the
techniques successfully employed by ILO, and rejected traditional in-
ternational legal norms. However, from these alternatives to reservations
the later negotiated reservation has emerged; therefore, it is submitted
that the more limited alternatives are in reality preliminary stages in an
evolutionary process. The real significance of the ILO and Council
spheres of "Common Law" lies in the end products-fully developed
techniques capable of conflict-resolving. Such practical success could not
be realized by the League or the United Nationsl Precisely, the Council
took the additional step beyond the elaborate flexibility devices of ILO
and "created" a more sophisticated instrument. Against this background,
questions of legal philosophy and jurisprudence are only of secondary
importance.
The future development within both organizations will depend pri-
marily on the subject matter of the Conventions, coupled with the ever-
present difficulty of obtaining widespread ratification. The variety of
subject matter topics covered by the European Treaty Series requires
different techniques in each case. The writer strongly favors this func-
tional approach. The "European Common Law" will continue to develop
from actual practice-on a "case by case" basis-instead of retaining
a rigid legal norm. It appears that this pragmatic orientation has resulted
in the diverse number of practical solutions, with the result that it be-
comes somewhat difficult to detect the underlying similarities in Council
practice. 19 7 This observation leads to one final objective test; the recent
conventions which were signed from 1964 to 1969 (Nos. 48 through 69)
are extremely complicated documents in comparison with earlier instru-
ments due to the fact that they incorporate a large number of the devices
discussed throughout this study. In particular, clauses permitting the
adoption of higher standards are very common;'19 therefore, the com-
plexity and sophistication of these recent treaties indicate that the future
course of the Council's "European Common Law" is moving toward
greater use of escalation concepts. Once minimum standards have been
accepted, every opportunity will be given the Members to adopt higher-
type obligations.
The major contribution of the Council of Europe to the science of
treaty law is that a system has been created whereby the parties can
agree in advance of signature to permit only those reservations set forth
197. A few examples can be found, i.e., Convention on Traffic Offenses, art. 32, supra
note 120 and Convention on Conditionally Released Offenders, art. 38. The language of the
two articles is identical.
198. E.g., European Code of Social Security, art. 2, supra note 168. See notes 190-94
supra and 202-06 infra.
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in the final instrument, but no others. Thus, a major solution to a very
perplexing problem has emerged at the regional level. Furthermore, this
unique negotiated reservation has proved to be very successful in re-
solving the issue of preserving the essential integrity of the multilateral
conventions and, at the same time, obtaining a maximum ratification.
Because of the importance of negotiated reservations (along with the
alternatives previously perfected by ILO) continued study of this area
is indicated in order to determine the answer to questions incapable of
complete analysis at this time: 1) what will be the final form of the very
complicated reservations emerging from Council practice; 2) will the
Council be forced to move closer to the International Law standard, or
will it be able to retain its negotiated reservation as the only acceptable
reserving scheme, at least in the majority of cases; 3) will ILO be in-
fluenced by Council practice and thereby modify its traditional stand;
and 4) the most speculative point, will other regional and international
institutions duplicate the negotiated reservation, perhaps as to a few
selected treaty instruments?
Tentative answers have already been given in some detail; yet, the
underlying consideration is the special jurisdiction and competence of
the particular organization (in consideration of the special topics covered
by each multilateral treaty as influenced by current political pressures).
In other words, ILO as a specialized agency of the United Nations, in-
cluding private delegates in its major subdivisions, will not be able to
adopt a major system of reservations, although the writer believes that
some reservations have inadvertently crept in, oftentimes disguised as
understandings or alternatives. Such instances are quite rare, and serious
issue can be raised as to this evaluation. Without question, in theory at
least, it is certain that ILO will not be influenced by the Council. At the
very least, ILO will make every effort to adhere to its prior stand,
whereas the Council will become ever more pragmatic; therefore, the
future position of ILO seems more firmly established than that of the
Council. In general, the same conclusion will not necessarily apply to
other institutions. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, an international institution including the United States, Can-
ada, Japan, and major European states as full members, is already in
the final stages of developing a practice of specialized reservations. 111
199. As this study is nearing completion, the work of the OECD is still in a preliminary
stage. Under consideration is a scheme to limit the use of negotiated reservations to only
a few States (or even a single State) and not necessarily to all twenty-one Members. In some
instances only the reserving State(s) will be allowed to benefit from the use of a particular
reservation. This criterion of the international organization will be contrary to traditional
international law, and also to the "European Common Law" of the Council because reciprocity
will not apply! By eliminating the doctrine of reciprocity, the OECD-at least as to this
1971]
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As to the final question posed above, there is strong evidence that the
United Nations, through its International Law Commission, has to a
significant degree considered the use of negotiated reservations. 0 None-
theless, the writer proposes by way of recommendation that the Inter-
national Law Commission at least consider the Council's unique practice
in its future work. Perhaps, in a modified form, or used in connection
with traditional reservations, or attached to specialized multilateral con-
ventions, such negotiated reservations (possibly in conjunction with
escalation clauses) might help to resolve disputes similar to the Genocide
Case in which the International Court of Justice, rather than the nego-
tiating parties, had to determine if attached reservations were compatible
with the essential aim and purpose of the Convention.
The two earlier questions are the more important and indeed the more
difficult to answer. Specifically, in what direction is the Council of Europe
moving at the present time? First, the writer is of the opinion that the
seventeen-member political group will make every attempt to rely on
negotiated reservations and continue to reject the OAS and United Na-
tions systems. Therefore, the Council will continue to employ its unique
European law, standing midway between the ILO and International Law
criteria. Of course, numerous specific problems must still be resolved, as
to each specialized multilateral convention. For example, should optional
articles be set forth in the Treaty, or alternatively, be placed in ac-
companying annexes or protocols? In other words, where is the dividing
line between reservations and amendments? This basic issue will not be
finally resolved in the near future. Second, he is of the opinion that even
greater emphasis will be placed on ILO's escalation concept for the pur-
pose of permitting each Member to subsequently withdraw prior reser-
vations. Such a goal will be accomplished by employing all of the
flexibility devices discussed in this study; hence, much more frequent
use will be made of optional articles that allow subsequent adherence to
higher standards.21 Individual governments will be encouraged to accept
such options, regardless of hesitancy on the part of major states or
"blocs" of powers, so as to extend the coverage of European Conven-
norm-is moving closer to ILO; conversely, as regards the use of any reservations, the
OECD is more akin to the Council's practice. In any event, the OECD at the international
level has changed traditional international law in a highly specialized area-specialized in the
sense that its membership consists of highly industrialized and economically advanced States.
As this "island of unique international law" develops, additional research could prove highly
rewarding.
200. The International Law Commission has devoted some attention to regional practice.
See 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, art. 20, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/5209, at 19 (1962), "Effect of
Reservations," which provides that the general rules will not apply to organizations.
201. This conclusion is supported primarily by the spirit of Conventions Nos. 46-53.
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tions.2°  In some cases non-members will be encouraged to accede. '  In
short, every possibility will be exhausted for the purpose of making ac-
cession as easy as possible, once the basic Parts or Articles have been
ratified by the minimum number of Members. The realistic adoption of
absolute minimums is fundamental to the entire European legal sys-
tem. For example, the Council will permit states to adopt higher criteria,
even by means of supplemental bilateral and simple multilateral agree-
ments, as one means of extending prior minimums. This technique has
often been found useful by ILO.-° In some extreme cases, states may
provisionally apply articles not yet in force in order to prevent delay;'"
and, in other instances, a Member may treat the obligation as one arising
from international treaty law, subject to national implementation.^0 In
general, the future direction in which European treaty law is moving be-
comes clear.
By way of further recommendation, a complete re-examination of
present practices-and especially future progress within both the ILO
and European systems-should be undertaken immediately to clarify re-
maining unresolved issues. That is to say, the work begun by the Inter-
national Law Commission 07 and the American Law Institute should be
202. E.g., Convention on the elaboration of a European Pharmacopeia, art. 3; Convention
on Conditionally Released Offenders, art. 36; Convention on Traffic Offenses, arts. 31 & 32;
European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts, art. 11.
203. E.g., Convention on Conditionally Released Offenders, art. 35; Convention on
Traffic Offenses, art. 38.
204. See note 45 supra. See especially, Convention on the elaboration of a European
Pharmacopoeia, art. 16 which states: "Supplementary agreements may be made concerning
the detailed implementation of the provisions of the present Convention"
205. Id. art. 17 maintains: 'Tending the entry into force of the present Convention in
accordance with the provisions of Article 11, the Signatory States agree, in order to avoid
any delay in the implementation of the present Convention, to apply it provisionally from
the date of signature, in conformity with their respective constitutional systems."
206. This very unusual method of implementation can best be seen in the Convention on
Conditionally Released Offenders, art. 38(4) which states: "Any Contracting Party may,
on signing the present Convention, or on depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance
or accession, notify the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe that it considers
ratification, acceptance or accession as entailing an obligation, in international law, to in-
troduce into municipal law measures to implement the said Convention.'
207. Since completion of the text there is growing evidence that some United Nations
Conventions are adopting the standard originally enunciated in the Genocide Case, supra
note 3, in that "compatibility . . . with the object and purpose of the Convention" has be-
come the prime test. The adoption of such criterion represents a reversal of the stand taken
by the I.CJ. in 1951. See note 2 supra. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 14, art. 20, par. 2, at S1,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), which states: "A reservation incompatible with the object and
purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted... 2'
Paragraph 2 of the above convention also moves closer to the numerical test advocated
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duplicated for the primary reason that ILO has already made a signif-
icant contribution to its "ILO Common Law;" likewise the Council of
Europe has made major contributions to its own "European Common
Law" plus the regional law in some other institutions. Now is the time
to begin serious re-examination. The Council has survived its first decade,
despite the political overtones remaining after World War II. As the
Council of Europe perfects its existing machinery greater attention can
be devoted to fundamental legal theory and problems of jurisprudence.
The sixty-nine European Conventions now constitute the foundation of a
"European Common Law" that will continue to grow during the coming
decade. As the Council reacts to mounting political and economic crises,
its regional law will necessarily be subject to further change. Basic legal
norms will reflect practical realities; consequently, constant re-examina-
tion is mandatory.
by Anderson, supra note 19, to the extent that "a reservation shall be considered incom-
patible or inhibitive if at least two-thirds of the States Parties to this Convention object
to it." In short, each signatory and potential signatory must render an independent judgment
as to whether every proposed reservation is compatible. As stated by Professor Egon
Schwelb: "The provision is rather liberal and goes far in the direction of 'flexibility' In the
matter of reservations. If one-third of the States Parties agree with the reserving State, the
latter's reservation stands and the reserving State becomes a Party to the Convention. It is
necessary for two-thirds of the Parties to object, within a period of ninety days, in order
to make a reservation inadmissible." Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 996, 1056-57 (1966).
Such major changes in United Nations treaty practice will most certainly be felt by the
Council of Europe; therefore, the negotiated reservation may become even more liberal.
Conversely, negotiated reservations and escalation devices might also be employed by the
United Nations to give greater flexibility and, at the same time, eliminate the necessity of
signatories examining the compatibility of all reservations, due to the fact that problems
would be resolved in advance of signature. Consequently, the practice developed by the
Council still appears superior to that of the United Nations, notwithstanding the above
mentioned attempts to liberalize traditional reservation techniques.
